We consider a model for the evolution of cooperation in a population where individuals may have one of a number of different heritable and distinguishable traits or tags. Individuals interact with each of their neighbors on a square lattice by playing a one shot prisoner's dilemma game. The decision to cooperate or defect is contingent on each individual's perception of its opponent's tag. Unlike in other tag-based models individuals do not compare their own tag to that of their opponent. When perception is perfect the cooperation rate is substantially higher than in the usual spatial prisoner's dilemma game when the cost of cooperation is high. The enhancement in cooperation is positively correlated with the number of different tags. The more diverse a population is the more cooperative it becomes. When individuals start with an inability to perceive tags the population evolves to a state where individuals gain partial, but not perfect perception. The ability to perceive tags evolves to lower levels when the cost of cooperation is higher, with a corresponding higher rate of cooperation than would be the case if perception where perfect.
Introduction
One of the enduring questions in evolutionary biology, which dates back to Darwin [1] , is how can cooperative or altruistic behavior emerge in a competitive environment where the struggle for survival and natural selection would seem to favor self-interest? Since cooperation between individuals, from single celled organisms to human societies is widespread, an explanation for its evolution is needed. The evolution of cooperation has been an active area of research since Hamilton proposed a mechanism of kin selection to explain it in the 1960's [2] . With the advent of evolutionary game theory [3] , the subject has lent itself to mathematical analysis using some version of the prisoner's dilemma game. One version of this game involves interacting individuals or agents choosing one of two strategies: cooperate by offering a benefit to the other player at some cost to itself, or defect by offering nothing. An agent who defects will always receive a higher payoff than one who cooperates, but a group of cooperators is better off than a group of defectors.
Early work to resolve this dilemma considered the effect of repeated interactions on cooperation [4, 5, 6, 7] . In such situations agents can adopt strategies that are contingent on the outcome of previous interactions, making it possible for various forms of cooperation based on reciprocity to evolve. However, although such generally cooperative strategies can be evolutionarily stable, they have difficulty gaining a foothold in an environment of defectors and some are not stable if individuals make mistakes [6, 7] . An alternative mechanism for maintaining cooperation is viscosity or spatial structure [8, 9, 10, 11, 12] , whereby agents preferentially interact with a few neighboring agents. In this case cooperative behavior can survive and even grow provided initial clusters of cooperating agents can form and the cost of cooperating is sufficiently low [12] .
Anther scenario for the evolution of cooperation, related to kin selection, is the green beard effect, popularized by Dawkins [13] . If a gene for some distinguishable trait or tag (such as a green beard) also leads to a tendency to cooperate with others who share that tag then cooperation can be sustained. The observable tag, such as a color, scent or shape of some biological feature, could serve as a loose and perhaps inaccurate proxy for recognizing related individuals. While such a linking of a tag with recognition and cooperative response to a single gene was initially felt to be unlikely, there is some biological evidence in support of this idea [14, 15, 16] . Tags are also thought to play a role in enhancing cooperation in society, with accents, secret handshakes, religion and ethnicity being cues that encourage cooperation between similar others [17] . A nice feature of the evolution of cooperation through heritable tags is that individuals do not need to have the capacity to remember the results of past interactions; they only need the ability to detect and respond to heritable tags.
Recently, several theoretical models for the evolution of cooperation involving heritable tags have been proposed [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23] . The mechanism by which tags are introduced varies, but the common thread is that agents adopt strategies that are contingent on the tag of their opponent. Both the tag and the strategy are inherited and are subject to mutation, although they need not evolve together. Riolo et al. [18] and Sigmund et al. [19] discuss a model in which well-mixed agents cooperate with those who have a tag that is within a particular tolerance level of their own, and defect otherwise. The tags in this instance are continuous. The system can evolve to a state with a relatively high level of cooperation, were most individuals share similar tags, but have a relatively low tolerance level. However the dynamics are quite unstable, leading to "tides of tolerance". Highly intolerant mutant strategies typically invade more tolerant and cooperative ones, which results a drop in the cooperation rate. Eventually mutations give rise to more tolerant individuals with a different tag -resulting in a return to cooperative behavior, and the cycle continues. Traulsen and Schuster [20] , proposed a discrete version of this model, in which there are two tags and two levels of tolerance. This model is amenable to analysis using replicator dynamics and leads to a similar dynamical situation. Once criticism of these models is that cooperation with other individuals who have identical tags is assumed [24] . A simple modification to the model that allows individuals the option of not cooperating with those who have identical tags results in a loss of cooperative behavior. However, it has since been shown that if the mutation rate for tags is greater than the mutation rate for strategies, cooperative behavior can predominate, even if like individuals are not assumed to cooperate with each other [25] .
Another approach has been to study these and more general tag models for the case where agents are not uniformly mixed, but are constrained by some viscosity or spatial structure [22, 23, 17, 26] . While tags are not needed to establish cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma, they can enhance it. In the model introduced by Jansen and Baalen [22] , agents can adopt a strategy of either cooperating or defecting against those who share their tag and defecting against those with a different tag. The dynamics is relatively stable and cooperative provided the tag and strategy are not always inherited together. One interesting feature is the positive correlation between number of tags and the level of cooperation. Hammond and Axelrod [23] allowed for the additional conditional strategy that individuals could optionally cooperate with those who had a dissimilar tag. Although such behavior rarely evolved, they showed that the cooperation rate is sustain at levels above what is normally expected in the spatial prisoner's dilemma even when the cost of cooperation is high.
A common outcome in all tag models is that cooperation is enhanced by the presence of heritable tags in a population -with the nice result that diversity breeds cooperation. However, there is a dark side to this outcome. While agents cooperate within groups of the same tag, they almost invariably defect against those with different tags. They are thus loyal to their group of like tagged agents but inhospitable to those who are dissimilar. Such agents are called ethnocentric agents [17] . Thus defection between individuals is now replaced by defection between groups of otherwise cooperative individuals.
In this paper we introduce a more general tag model than has previously been studied. We consider a class of tag based contingent strategies that do not involve an individual or agent comparing its own tag to that of the agent it is interacting with. Instead, agents opt to cooperate or not based solely on their perception of their opponent's tag. This notion seems consistent with the way organisms with limited cognitive ability might interact. Agents may not have the ability to make a comparison between themselves and an opponent; they may not even have the selfawareness to recognize their own tag. Agents simply use the tag as a cue or trigger for a cooperative or defecting response. This model also lends itself to studying systems with multiple tags that are inherited in different ways.
One of the purposes of this study is to explore whether it is possible to get the enhanced cooperation in tag based models while allowing some hospitality, or cooperation with dissimilar others, to evolve. To this end we introduce the possibility that agents are occasionally unable to recognize the tag of an opponent due to some limitations to their perception. Limitations in perception may be due to some external environmental condition, such as darkness or fog, or it could be specific to individuals, with some having a better ability to perceive tags than others. We analyze both situations.
The Model
We consider spatially separated agents on a square lattice playing the one shot prisoner's dilemma game with the eight adjacent agents in their Moore neighbourhood. We use a standard and biologically relevant implementation of the prisoner's dilemmas game, which involves interactions between two individuals, or agents, who can optionally offer some benefit b to their opponent at some cost c to themselves. Agents who offer a benefit are said to cooperate, and those who do not defect. In any single interaction agents always stand to gain more if they defect then if they cooperate. However, a group of mutual cooperators, who gain an average of the average payoff of b − c (we assume c < b) are better off than a group of mutual defectors, who gain nothing.
Each agent is randomly assigned a number corresponding to one of m possible tags. The tag number forms part of a genome which also includes a strategy array. Each entry in the array is the probability of cooperating with an agent with a tag number corresponding to the array index. For example, if there are four tags, then the genome will be a tag number between 0 and 3 and a strategy array containing four probabilities. With this setup, two different types of simulation are possible. In the first, the pure strategy scenario, probabilities are either 0 or 1. This means that an agent will either always cooperate (1) or always defect (0) when encountering another agent with a particular tag. An agent with strategy array [1,1,0,1], for example, cooperates with all agents except those with tag 2. In the second case, the mixed strategy scenario, the probability of cooperating with an agent with a particular tag can be any real number on the interval [0, 1]. In this paper we deal with the pure strategy case and will consider the mixed case in a future paper.
Agents start with randomly chosen strategies and tags. In each generation, every agent plays the prisoner's dilemma once with each of its eight neighbours, accumulating fitness points based on any costs it incurs or benefits it gains. Each agent then adopts the strategy and tag of its fittest neighbour, unless it is the fittest, in which case it keeps its own tag and strategy. Thus, in this model we adopt synchronous updating with strong selection. A biological interpretation of this update scheme is that once each generation all agents die and new agents grow in their place and adopt the genes of the fittest neighbour. An alternative interpretation is a learning model, where each agent adopts the strategies and tags of the neighbour who is most successful. At each generation or time step, there is a certain probability µ for mutation. Each part of the genetic code mutates independently, including the individual bits of the strategy array. When the tag gene mutates a random tag is assigned. Each item in the strategy array mutates independently with 0 → 1 or 1 → 0 in the event that a mutation occurs.
Our objective is to determine what types of agents evolve in a simulation of this game and, in particular, to determine the proportion of agents who engage in cooperative behaviour. Agents who cooperate with any agent, regardless of tag, are called All-C. Agents who defect against all other are called All-D. Agents who only cooperate with other agents who share their tag and defect against all other types of agents are called ethnocentric agents. Many other strategies exist.
The simulations were run using NETLOGO 4.1 on a 200x200 toroidal grid for a total of 40,000 agents. Simulations were run long enough for the system to reach equilibrium, if one existed. This was typically achieved within 1000 generations in the case of no mutations, and as long as 10000 generations when considering mutations. Longer runs were necessary when the cost to benefit ration c/b was at a transition value between highly cooperative behaviour and highly defective behaviour. We recorded four quantities in each run: The mean cooperation rate, the diversity of agents, the mean probability of cooperating with like-tagged agents (loyalty), and the mean probability of cooperating with different tagged agents (hospitality). The cooperation rate is the proportion of agents who cooperate each round and is equal to the mean fitness of the agents as a proportion of the fitness that would result if all agents cooperated. Diversity is the Simpson's diversity index
where N is the total number of agents, m is the number of tags and n i is the number of agents with tag i. For large N the maximum value of D approaches the number of tags m. The diversity index is used to track the diversity of tag types as a function of time.
We define perception p as a number between 0 and 1, which represents the probability that an agent is able to identify the tag of its opponent. If an agent is unable to identify the tag of its opponent it randomly assigns a tag and then follows the appropriate strategy for that tag. So for a p = 0.5, half the time an agent identifies the correct tag, and half the time the agent sees a random tag. We first consider the case where perception is globally defined. All agents have the same perception that does not change. Then we consider the case of local perception, whereby each agent has its own heritable level of perception which is also subject to mutation.
Results and Discussion

Perfect Perception
We first establish how the equilibrium value of the cooperation rate depends on (a) the cost to benefit ratio and (b) the number of tags, when there is no mutation and perfect perception. The cost to benefit ratio is varied between 0.1 and 0.9. We repeated this procedure for each of the tag numbers 1, 2, 4 and 8. With tag number set to 1, there are no distinguishable tags and the simulation should be consistent with the results of the usual spatial prisoner's game [8, 9, 10, 11, 12] .
Cooperation rate as a function of cost is shown in figure 1 , with the mean of ten replicates plotted and error bars indicating the standard error.
In all cases cooperation is high (around 0.9) for c/b < 0.25., with the cooperation rate for 2 and 4 tags being somewhat below the case for 1 tag and 8 tags. Thus, the presence of distinguishable tags does not significantly increase cooperation for c/b < 0.25. In this region of parameter space, agents form like-tagged clusters employing an ethnocentric strategy. Agents that survive cooperate only with other individuals who share their own tag, even though they are not capable of determining what their own tag is. Defection occurs on the boundary between two ethnocentric clusters with different tags, or due to the presence of small numbers of All-D agents on the boundary of a like tagged cluster. For 0.25 < c/b < 0.5 the system shows a drop in the cooperation rate with increasing cost. The drop is most pronounced when the number of tags is small. This transition is a result of the fact that As a consequence the cooperation rate is low. For a more complete discussion of fundamental clusters for a variety of spatial games see Hauert [27] . With 2 or more heritable tags, All-D agents do well at the start of the simulation for c/b > 1/4, causing the cooperation rate to fall. However, as these agents encounter ethnocentric agents with different tags, their invasion is halted and occasionally reversed. The more types of tags there are the more likely All-D agents are to find themselves interacting with ethnocentric agents with different tags. Thus the cooperation rate is higher the more tags there are. We see a positive correlation between cooperation rate and number of tags, at least for these levels of cost. Jansen et al. [22] observed a similar result in their model. Figure 2 shows the results of three simulations for the case where the cost to benefit ratio is 0.4. Figure 2(a) shows the case of two tags (coloured red and green). The darker shades are defecting strategies, and the lighter shades are ethnocentric strategies, cooperating with their own tag, but not the others. Figure 2 (b) has four tags with colors red, green, purple and blue. The proportion of light shaded ethnocentric strategies is significantly higher, indicating the higher levels of cooperation. Figure 2(c) shows the case with eight tags, with a similar highly cooperative state. Notice that the cluster sizes of each tag are significantly larger in the eight tag case, and that almost all the defecting strategies have been eliminated. Because cluster size for the eight tag case grows so large, the diversity index tends to drop significantly below 8. When simulations are run with a larger world size the diversity does not drop as much, yet the cooperation rate remains the same.
There is a clear transition in behaviour of the models at c/b = 0.5. For c/b < 0.5 the equilibrium is stable and reached in less than 200 generations. For c/b > 0.5 the behaviour of the model is highly unpredictable for 4 and 8 tags. In this region of parameter space, defecting clusters are able to invade cooperators at a rate that is faster than they are invaded by a ethnocentric strategies with unlike tags. However, if All-D agents eliminate a local population of like tagged cooperating agents, they will eventually succumb to the ethnocentric agents that are invading them. The dynamics can be quite involved. Occasionally ethnocentric agents fixate, at other times All-D agents do. Often, it takes over 5000 generations before fixation occurs, with the ultimate fate frequently being decided by some chance encounter near the end of the simulation. For this reason we ran 30 replicates of There is another outcome that can arise for c/b > 0.5. Mutual coexistence of agents with two different tags can evolve, with the following tag-strategy combination. Agents defect against other agents who share their own tag and cooperate with agents of the other tag type. Such agents are disloyal, but hospitable. They could be called traitors [26] , although this term does not adequately describe the new form of cooperative behavior that results. Rather than forming well defined clusters, these agents form an intricate web of the two different tag types with mutual support that helps them resist invasion by most other strategies. The equilibrium is dynamic, with agents alternating strategies and tags every other generation. While this situation exhibits hospitality it comes with a lack of loyalty. The overall rate of cooperation of such configurations is significantly less than what would result with ethnocentric agents, but is higher than would occur if all agents were All-D.
Mutation
In the above results we have not considered mutation. When we run the simulations with a mutation rate µ = 0.001 per generation, per gene, the results are qualitatively similar to the case with no mutation, although the overall level of cooperation is reduced for all costs. The complex dynamics for c/b > 0.5 also disappears. The results are shown in figure 3 .
As c/b increases from 0.1 there is a gradual decrease in the cooperation rate until a sharp transition to zero or low cooperation. This transition occurs at c/b = 0.25 for 1 tag, at c/b = 0.4 for 2 tags and c/b = 0.5 for 4 and 8 tags. However, for 8 tags the cooperation rate does not fall to zero for high cost, but approaches a cooperation rate of approximately 0.1. Thus the consequence of mutation when there are 8 tags is to undermine the highly cooperative behaviour for c/b > 0.5 that was sustained as a result of complex dynamics with no mutation, in favour of a low but non -ero cooperation rate. This non-zero cooperation rate for 8 tags is sustained by the weak selection pressure in favour of all-D agents at high costs and mutation, which introduces new tags and ethnocentric strategies which prevent the All-D agents from fixating. However, for 8 tags the cooperation rate does not fall to zero for high cost, but approaches a cooperation rate of approximately 0.1.
Limited Global Perception
We now introduce the possibility that agents have a limited perception of their opponent's tag. In this section all agents have the same globally assigned perception, which corresponds to a situation where agents have their ability to perceive tags limited by an environmental constraint of some kind. We restrict our attention to the 4 tag model, although results for 2 and 8 tags are similar. The mutation rate is first set to zero. We consider non-zero mutation in the next section. We vary perception between p = 0 (no ability to perceive tags) and p = 1 (perfect ability to perceive tags), for a variety of different costs. The results are shown in figure 4 , with cooperation rate plotted vs. perception for costs 0.1, 0.3, 0.5 and 0.6. Consider the left axis of the figure, where perception is zero. For each Figure 4 : The cooperation rate is plotted as a function of perception for different cost to benefit ratios. Cooperation rate is higher for lower costs, as expected. As perception increases the cooperation rate curves approaches a line called the ethnocentric limit. This line gives the expected cooperation rate if all agents are ethnocentric with the same tag. Cooperation rates initially decrease with increasing perception when cost is low, but increase when cost is high. Cooperation rates are highest when perception is near perfect for c/b = 0.1 and c/b = 0.3, but achieves its maximum value for imperfect perception for c/b = 0.5 and c/b = 0.6. cost the cooperation rate is lower than the case of perfect perception which we considered earlier and is shown on the right axis. When p = 0 agents associate a random tag to all opponents, completely independent of the actual tag. Hence the benefits of heritable tags associated with our earlier analysis are diminished. Agents choose to cooperate or defect depending on a randomly assigned tag and the corresponding entry in their particular strategy array. For example, All-C agents with a strategy array with four cooperating genes [1,1,1,1] would still cooperate all the time, but an agent with an array with three cooperating genes, such as [1,0,1,1], would end up cooperating 75% of the time and defecting 25% of the time. For cost 0.1, the equilibrium cooperation rate is 0.75, indicating that generally cooperative agents with three cooperating genes and one defecting gene fixate. Such agents are loyal to their own tag and hospitable with at least some other tags. As costs increase cooperating genes become less and less favourable until All-D fixates at cost 0.6.
As perception increases the cooperation rate approaches a common limiting line for all costs that we have called the ethnocentric limit. This line shows the cooperation rate of agents in a world where all agents have the same tag type and follow an ethnocentric strategy. In such a world, the cooperation rate r is given by the expression:
where p is the level of perception and m is the number of tags. Points above this line indicate the presence of strategies that are more cooperative than ethnocentric strategies. Points below this line indicate the presence of more All-D strategies, or smaller clusters of like-tagged agents with ethnocentric strategies. As perception increases from p = 0 it becomes increasingly favourable for agents to adopt an ethnocentric strategy. For certain levels of perception the world becomes populated with large clusters of ethnocentric strategies and the cooperation rate curves approach and then follow the ethnocentric limit. However, as perception continues to increase, the cooperation rate falls below the ethnocentric limit. This is chiefly because ethnocentric clusters become smaller and thus the number of interactions with unlike tagged opponents on the boundary between clusters becomes more common. In addition, as perception improves All-D agents are increasingly able to dominate when the cost of cooperation is high.
For each cost there is a level of perception where the cooperation rate is maximum. For c/b = 0.1 and c/b = 0.3 the maximum is at a perception close to 1.0. For c/b = 0.5 the maximum cooperation rate occurs at perception 0.7, and for c/b = 0.6 the maximum is at perception 0.5. We conclude that imperfect perception of inherited tags can enhance cooperation significantly compared to the case with perfect perception when the cost to benefit ratio is high. The question that arises is, if each agent had its own inherited level of perception which was subject to mutation, would perception evolve to a level that corresponds to a maximum cooperation rate at each cost? We pursue this question next.
Limited Local Perception
We now consider the case where perception is locally assigned, so that each agent has its own heritable level of perception. Perception thus becomes another part of each agent's genetic code which is allowed to mutate independently. When the perception gene mutates the perception level is set to a random number between 0 and 1. We choose a mutation rate of 0.001, as before. In what follows all agents initially have zero perception. The level of perception evolves to non-zero values through mutation and selection. Similar results apply for other initial conditions, such as when each agent is randomly assigned an initial perception between 0 and 1. The simulation was run for costs varying from 0.1 to 0.9 for up to 10,000 generations until the cooperation rate reached an equilibrium state. The results are shown in figure 5 . The relationship between the cooperation rate and the corresponding evolved perception levels are superimposed on a graph similar to figure 4 , showing the cooperation rate as function of global assigned perception levels. The cooperation rate curves are slightly different than the curves in figure 4 because mutation rate is now 0.001 instead of zero, so that tags and strategies are subject to mutation. However, the qualitative features are similar, with overall cooperation rates reduced. Figure 5 : Cooperation rate is plotted as a function of perception with mutation rate µ = 0.001. The evolved perception line shows the cooperation rate and the mean perception levels that resulted when perception was allowed to evolve with different cost to benefit ratios. The corresponding cost to benefit ratios are labeled on the graph. This line is superimposed on the cooperation rate versus perception curves for fixed perception. Perfect perception does not evolve. For high cost to benefit ratio perception evolves to a level that maximizes the cooperation rate.
The evolved perception curve shows that for high cost of c/b ≥ 0.5 perception evolves to a level that maximizes the rate of cooperation. For c/b = 0.6 the perception evolves to 0.4, with a resulting cooperation rate of 0.25. For c/b = 0.5 the perception evolves to 0.5 resulting in a cooperation rate of 0.4. In both cases the cooperation rate is much higher than it would be for perfect perception, when it is approximately zero. For lower costs, the optimal level of cooperation would occur for perception near 1. However, for low costs perception evolves to between 0.7 and 0.8, resulting in suboptimal rates of cooperation. With perfect perception at low cost, ethnocentric strategies predominate, even with mutation. However, if an ethnocentric agent in a cluster of like tagged ethnocentric agents has slightly lower perception than the average agent in its neighbourhood it will benefit from the occasional defection that results from misperceiving a neighbour's tag. Hence, lower perception is selected for. However, if the perception is too low, such agents will be at a disadvantage when they encounter unlike-tagged ethnocentric agents at the boundary of a cluster, who will not cooperate with them, but with whom they will cooperate occasionally. Thus a relatively high perception that is less than perfect represents the equilibrium that balances these competing selection pressures.
Conclusion
The results demonstrate that the presence of heritable tags with strategies for cooperation that are contingent on the tag of an opponent leads to a significant increase in overall cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, compared to the case when there are no tags, so long as c/b > 0.25. The most common agents are those with an ethnocentric strategy, whereby agents cooperate with like-tagged agents and defect against agents with different tags. This occurs even though agents in this model are not cognizant of their own tag. High levels of cooperation can be maintained for increasingly large costs as the number of tags increases, although for c/b > 0.5 cooperation rates are still low, even for a large number of tags when mutations are included.
Interestingly, when agents occasionally misperceive the tag of other agents, cooperation can be further enhanced when costs are high ( c/b ≥ 0.5). Indeed, when the ability to perceive is allowed to evolve, agents evolve partial, but less than perfect perception. For high cost of cooperation this results in agents achieving an even higher rate of cooperation than they would for perfect perception of tags. Partial perception results in a higher proportion of agents having ethnocentric strategies then would be the case with perfect perception, where for high costs al-most all agents are All-D. The increased proportion of agents who are ethnocentric compensates for the fact that they occasionally make mistakes and defect. Another nice consequence of partial perception is that such agents will occasionally cooperate with agents with unlike tags, thus showing some hospitality. Partial perception could be interpreted as an occasional disinclination to pay attention to tags when making a choice about whether or not to cooperate, rather than simply an inability to identify a tag correctly. Perception would thus be a measure of sensitivity to tags. In such an interpretation agents who are not solely focused on the tag of their opponent end up with a higher fitness and the overall cooperation rate in the population is higher, when the cost of cooperation is high. The results suggest that when the cost to benefit ratio is high the perception of or sensitivity to distinguishable tags will be low with a corresponding low but non-zero level of ethnocentric behavior. When cost to benefit ratio is low the perception of distinguishable tags will be high and the level of ethnocentric behavior will be high. To test if these results are reasonable consider a model for costs and benefits associated with resource sharing in an environment with limited resources presented in Appendix A. When resources are scarce, the cost and benefit of sharing both increase, but we argue that the cost to benefit ratio decreases. Thus if our model is correct we would expect that when resources are strongly limited, such as in times of natural disaster, or in the case of war in human interactions, sensitivity to differences in tags will be higher, with more ethnocentric behavior, and a higher overall level of cooperation. When resources are not as strongly limited, sensitivity to differences would be lower, with less ethnocentric behavior and overall lower levels of cooperation. This is a testable hypothesis. It is often the case that in times of war ethnic tensions are exacerbated, while in-group cooperation is enhanced. The period following 9/11 is an interesting example. It should also be possible to test these results in a biological setting.
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Appendix A. Model for costs and benefits
In this appendix we introduce a model for costs and benefits based on resource sharing. Suppose the amount of a particular resource that is required for an individual to survive is 1, and that the average amount of the resource available per individual is 1 + a. The parameter a, measures the excess of the resource. In times of severe shortage a → 0 and in times of plenty a → ∞. We take a ∈ (0, ∞). Suppose that there is some variance in the allocation for the resource, so that an individual will find itself with 1 + a ± δ with the plus or minus occurring randomly at different times (or alternatively plus for some types of resource and minus for others). δ is a measure of the inequality of the distribution of the resource. We assume no individual has negative value for the resource, and that there is always at least some unequal distribution of the resource. Thus δ ∈ (0, 1 + a]. Now consider an interaction between an individual with resource 1 + a + δ and one with resource 1 + a − δ. We will consider cooperation the donation of δ from the one who has excess to the one who has a deficit. We assume that all individuals will have the opportunity to cooperate with all other individuals, either because they will always have some surplus in a particular resource or because the surpluses and deficits fluctuate randomly over time. A reasonable assessment of the cost to the donator and the benefit to the recipient is to measure this donation relative to the initial resource allocation. Thus c = δ 1 + a + δ and b = δ 1 + a − δ .
With this allocation the cost to benefit ratio becomes
